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Introduction
          Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray are both post-structural theoretical feminists who 
have each published books in which they have sought to explore spirituality from a 
feminist perspective.  The first, Le Feminin et le Sacre, contains letters written by 
Kristeva and was published in French in 1998, then published in English (The Feminine 
and the Sacred ) through Columbia University Press in 2001.  The second, Entre Orient 
et Occident, was written by Irigaray in French in 1999 and subsequently published in 
English (Between East and West: From Singularity to Community) through Columbia 
University Press in 2002.  The first text consists of a correspondence between Kristeva 
and Catherine Clement, lasting for about a year; from November of 1996 to October of 
1997, in which Kristeva postulates that the “heart of the sacred” lies in a “synthesis…a 
new syncretism” between the “Chinese people” and her own “Greek or Judeo-Christian 
tradition” (170).  The second text consists of an extensive meditation by Irigaray in which 
she relies on her Yoga practice to suggest that the practice of breathing might 
“correspond to the source or the bridge from which to rethink both singularity and 
community” (12). 
Crossing Borders 
          Both Kristeva and Irigaray seek the redemption of human kind in a syncretism 
between Eastern and Western modes of being.  Kristeva, with a bachelor’s in Chinese, 
claims to have been drawn to the philosophy of Taoism as practiced in China.  Irigaray, 
after beginning to practice Yoga, uses her breathing practice to conceptualize her 
thoughts on the state of Western culture.  While Kristeva is drawn to China and to a sense 
of the sacred as developed along a Chinese trajectory, Irigaray is drawn to India and to 
the philosophy and practice of Yoga as developed along an Indian trajectory.  As a 







developed along a Japanese trajectory.  Unlike Kristeva, who considered learning the 
Chinese language “a waste of time…in the face of the ocean of ideograms and wisdom 
that are so different from our traditions,” I became completely absorbed in the use of 
Japanese characters and have found the wisdom that is retained in the Buddhist 
intellectual tradition, particularly with regard to Shingon Buddhism in Japan, as 
completely accessible and extremely pertinent to my theoretical and practical concerns 
(168).  Just as Irigaray demonstrates the ways in which she has incorporated the practice 
of breathing into her own body of knowledge, my Buddhist practice has become a part of 
my intellectual life. 
          Kristeva discloses to Clement that she has “a hunger for Chinese sacredness, 
composed of sexual duality, of the establishment of action, and of an efficacy that draws 
its strength from the void” and that she “tried to learn Chinese once in an attempt to 
accede to that sacred” because she “liked that taste, bland perhaps but very subtle, of the 
sacred: so far removed from that other so-called sacred that cuts the throats of men and 
women as if they were sheep” (168).  Kristeva relates to Clement that she “even managed 
to earn my bachelor’s degree in it” and went to China with the Tel Quel group where she 
once again was “seduced by the serene maturity of Chinese women…and disappointed by 
the national Communism that was challenging the Stalinist model but still followed it 
intrinsically” (170).  As her “own history became mixed up in all that” … she … “turned 
her back on politics.  Hence psychoanalysis , the novel, and the rest” (170).  Kristeva 
goes on to “admit that, in the long history of ‘sacreds,’ I allow myself to be seduced first 
and foremost by the flavors of the Tao, which, as everyone knows, suits a sage reconciled 
with the mother and with nature, ‘the one who alone is nourished by the mother,’ and 
who has nothing to defy or to demonstrate or to prove…” (168).  
          While Kristeva touches upon her regard for China and Chinese thought and does so 
rather impressionistically, Irigaray uses her trip to India and her encounter with Yoga to 
completely rethink her perspective on Western culture and to consider the global 
possibilities for an evolution of human consciousness.  Irigaray begins by noting a 
cultural crisis in which “the Western subject has come to a standstill at a moment in his 
journey” (xi).   

          In elucidating the nature of this crisis, Irigaray calls attention to the decline of 
humanity and locates this decline at a point where “Western man has above all failed to 
recognize and has neglected that which, it seems to me, should characterize his species: 
the ability to enter into relation with the other without reducing this relation to the 
satisfaction of instincts, of needs” (ix).   According to Irigaray, this state of affairs has 
come to be through a process of differentiation through which the West has alienated man 
from his own nature, and abstracted his subjectivity from the “sensible-intelligible and 
corporeal-spiritual dichotomies” to a realm that is “too exclusively mental” (5).  In her 
own “personal renaissance,” Irigaray began by “learning again to breathe, naively at first 
and then with the aid of masters from the East, or trained in the East”…and was able … 
“to glimpse the existence of another life, not in the beyond, but here below.  It was 
possible to live altogether otherwise than I had been taught, than what I could examine” 
(6).  It is on the basis of this fundamental realignment that Irigaray begins her meditation 
on a possible evolution of human consciousness through a transcendence of the Western 
subject as constituted by “mediations proper to the masculine subject,” toward a world in 
which “each of us no longer resembles a hunter of the absolute at war with every other 
but becomes the humble builder of a human interiority” (101). 
Thinking Through Eastern Practice 
          What is the nature of this coincidence between two leading post-structural 
theoretical feminists and such diverse Eastern traditions as Taoism and Yoga? Curiously, 
neither of these two intellectuals locates the nexus of their encounter with these traditions 
through the dynamic of an intellectual engagement.  Kristeva notes her attraction to 
“these charming Asians” without providing us with any further textual justification than 
her own intuition (170).  Irigaray explores her own embodied experience through the 
practice of breathing, but her encounter with the East, just as with Kristeva, remains 
tantalizingly elusive, and on the fringes of what we might call a rigorous process of 
intellectual engagement. 
        Westerners, on first encountering the “East” often ascribe to the “Orient” that which 
he or she feels is lacking in her own culture.  Irigaray’s insistent returning to the body, to 
the practice of breathing and to the presence of the corporeal in her encounter with the 
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“East” strikes me as is dangerously close to exoticizing the “East,” and to ascribing to the 
“East” an emphasis on the corporeal at the expense of the intellectual only because it is 
the corporeal that one feels is lacking in one’s own (Western) culture.  While Buddhism 
(as an “Eastern” practice) is certainly corporeal in so far as breathing and meditation are 
considered to be the axis of Buddhist meditation, there is also a rigorous, if not ferocious, 
intellectual tradition in Buddhist thought which dates from its inception in India in 
approximately 500 BCE.  The Buddhist intellectual tradition may have reached its apogee 
in the first to second century CE with the scholarship of Nagarjuna (circa 150-250 CE) 
and his founding of the Mâdhyamika (Doctrine of the Middle Position) School.  This 
intellectual vigor continued to sustain itself through the establishment of the Yogâcâra 
(The Way of Yoga) School [also known as Vijnânavâda school (Doctrine of 
Consciousness)] by Asanga and his brother, Vasubandhu, in the fourth or fifth century 
CE.  
          With regard to Buddhism and to the various cultural manifestations of Buddhism in 
Eastern countries such as India, China and Japan, there is a rigorous intellect at work, a 
radical questioning of being which reaches to the very core of what constitutes a human 
subject and that subject’s position in the cosmos.  This dynamic of questioning is not so 
far removed from the Western notion of the Socratic method.  The insight achieved 
through radical questioning is encapsulated in Buddhist thought under the rubric of 
wisdom. However, and in contradistinction to a purely intellectual pursuit of knowledge, 
Buddhism also asserts the concurrent need for compassionate action.  Indeed, within the 
Buddhist paradigm, the practice of wisdom will inevitably lead to the development of 
compassion and the practice of compassion will necessarily lead to wisdom.  The 
mind/body (rational/emotional) dichotomy, so peculiar to Post- enlightenment thinking in 
the West, is not to be found in Buddhist thought; the mind thinks through the body and 
the body gives form to the mind.   
          Kristeva intuits the dynamic of this relationship when she notes that the sacred lies 
in what the Chinese say, and “Chinese women ‘say’…body and soul: coupled” (170).  
Irigaray complains that in her Western experience “the body is no longer educated to 
develop its perceptions spiritually, but to detach itself from the sensible for a more 
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abstract, more speculative, more sociological culture,” and that Yoga brought her “back 
to this taste with texts that leads me from the innocence of sensations to a spiritual 
elaboration that permits their development, and sometimes their communication or 
sharing” (56).
An Intellectual Encounter with Eastern Thought  
          An intellectual engagement with Eastern practice (here Buddhist) might begin, first 
and foremost, with the notion of the Twelve Linked Chain of Dependent Origination, also 
known as Conditioned Genesis, or as Conditioned Arising (paticca-samuppâda).  The 
key sources for patticca-samuppâda are two Indian texts: the Nidâna Samyutta and the 
Mahâ-nidâna Sutta.   As feminist thinkers, Kristeva and Irigaray might find this concept 
of Dependent Origination to be profoundly relational, and fully interpenetrated with their 
feminist thinking.   To fully appreciate and to understand the dynamic inherent in this 
Buddhist concept of Dependent Origination is to reaffirm Irigaray’s intuition that her 
insights gleaned from Yogic practice provide a model for: 1) “restoring certain relations 
between feminine aboriginal cultures and patriarchalized Indo-European cultures, aiming 
not toward a reversal of power but a possible coexistence of  perspectives, of 
subjectivity’s, of worlds, of cultures,” and 2) “ the constitution of horizontal relations 
between the sexes” (15). 
          From a Buddhist perspective nothing in the world is absolute. According to the 
Doctrine of Dependent Origination, everything is conditioned; relative; and 
interdependent.  Nothing exists in vertical relation to anything else; everything exists in 
horizontal relation to everything else.  Irigaray appears to appropriate this Buddhist 
dynamic in her discourse on the politics of sexual difference when she notes that 
“difference is not preserved by a vertical transcendence, but thanks to the horizontal 
transcendence as irreducible to me, to mine” (102).  As a result “the objectivity of an 
unsurpassable difference will always be opposed to the domination of a consciousness” 
(98).   
          Buddhist thought elucidates the reason for this interrelatedness on a cosmological 
plane by articulating the twelve ‘links’ of Dependent Origination as a ‘chain’ through 

which we as humans engage in ontological being.  The links in the chain are described as 
follows:  
1) Through ignorance are conditioned volitional actions or karma-formations, 2) 
Through volitional actions is conditioned consciousness, 3) Through 
consciousness are conditioned mental and physical phenomena, 4) Through 
mental and physical phenomena are conditioned the six faculties (i.e., five 
physical sense organs and mind), 5) Through the six faculties is conditioned 
(sensorial and mental) contact, 6) Through (sensorial and mental) contact is 
conditioned sensation, 7) Through sensation is conditioned desire, ‘thirst’, 8) 
Through desire (‘thirst’) is conditioned clinging, 9) Through clinging is 
conditioned the  process of becoming, 10) Through the process of becoming is 
conditioned birth, 11) through birth are conditioned, 12) decay, death, 
lamentation, pain, etc. (Rahula 53-54).  
Wisdom, (i.e. the cessation of ignorance) results in the reversal of this process and in the 
cessation of suffering, pain, lamentation and death.  Compassion for others, (i.e. the 
desire to stop decay, death, lamentation and pain) will also motivate a reversal in this 
wheel of becoming.  Access to salvatory powers are granted and obtained through both
an intellectual (cessation of ignorance or wisdom) and an emotional engagement 
(compassionate care for others) with Buddhist practice. 
          Irigaray is well within the paradigm of Buddhist thought when she discusses her 
philosophy of sexual difference in her claims that “men and women forget the mystery of 
their difference, they reduce it to a corporeal particularity useful for the production of an 
orgasm and of a child” (84).  The mystery and the spiritualization of this ‘mystery’ to 
which Irigaray refers and that she has located in Yoga through her breathing practice; the 
space, gap, interval, or lacunae, or the nothingness (࿵) through and in which difference 
is located, is (from a Buddhist perspective) that which holds and supports difference; i.e. 
void.  To ‘forget’ (as Irigaray puts it) that mystery (nothingness or void) which sustains 
difference is to remain in ignorance (and suffering).  The spiritualization of that 
difference and the spiritualization of emptiness has been the intellectual/emotional 
trajectory of Buddhist thought since its very inception.   

          The notion of an independent, unconditioned soul or self (Iragary’s “corporeal 
particularity”) is absent from Buddhist thought, for there is nothing (according to 
Buddhism) that can be absolutely free (physical or mental) since everything is 
interdependent and relative. This  does not mean that one can’t talk about a “self,” as 
Buddhism does distinguish between conventional truth and ultimate truth.  To talk about 
‘I,’ about ‘you,’ about the self and subjectivity is not to lie, but to conform to the 
conventions of the world as we know it.  From a Buddhist perspective, the use of these 
categories of selfhood is provisional, and recognized as such.  Irigaray addresses her 
intuition of an understanding of the Twelve Linked Chain of Dependent Origination in 
phenomenological terms when she remarks:  
It is necessary to learn to think without centering on the object, for example, to 
think in a living and free manner, unattached, neither egological nor possessive.  
This does not mean not thinking but being capable of going beyond the inertias 
of thought in order to set its energy free. Is this not the path shown by Buddha 
and, in our age, in his own way, by Krishnamurti? (67).
     According to Jacques Lacan, the recognition that one has no ego and that there is only 
an ego ideal is at once “irreducible, traumatic, non-meaning” (Lacan 251).  That this 
recognition of one’s self as inherently empty should produce anxiety and trauma is the 
product of a singularly masculinized (here Western) intelligence.  Irigaray refers to this 
state of affairs as one of many “egological confusions,” for the cosmic nature of the 
human body is always enacted in the articulation “of a continuity between the present and 
immortality or eternity” (30-1).  To perceive the self as a bounded totality is to perceive 
oneself in the present as discontinuous with time, as dislocated, and as ruptured from the 
continuity of the micro and macrocosm.   
               In contradistinction to Lacan, Buddhism maintains that it is the belief in an ego 
construction that is traumatic (not salving), and it is toward this trauma of the Western 
spirit that both Kristeva and Irigaray are addressing their attentions and concerns.  
Irigaray speaks of the necessity for each of us to discover a “double subjectivity,” a self 
that is internally in relation with another ‘I’ (98).  She posits that the Western subject has 
been mediated through relations proper to a unified, masculine subject, as if that notion 

were both neutral and universal.  Rather, Irigaray feels, “nature as human nature is two:
masculine and feminine, and that it requires a double subjectivity, a double ‘I,’ in order to 
be cultivated” (98).  
         In Buddhism, this notion of self in difference; of self as located in relation, of self 
as compiled of relations; or as no-self; is known as anatta or No-Soul.  The need for self-
protection and self-preservation is deeply rooted in our animal natures.  In the first case 
human beings (from all positions on the globe) have created the notion of a God figure 
upon whom they can depend for self-protection, and in the latter case human beings 
(most notably from the Judeo-Christian tradition) have created the notion of an immortal 
soul that will live eternally.  Such is the nature of mankind’s consolation.  Yet both 
gestures involve a sacrifice; one which Irigaray feels benefits “masculine geneologies” 
alone and which takes the form of an “ill considered sacrifice of the body and of the 
universe to a coded and codeable knowledge outside a present act, to a truth that is valid 
in all times and all places” (34).   
The Bodhisattva as Intellectual
          Buddhism advocates the construction of a pure subject (a notion which Irigaray 
feels we in the West have lost); a subject that is in constant awareness of his or her own 
emptiness and of his or her subjectness to and in relation to the world.  What Kristeva 
intuited in the Chinese ability to draw strength from the void, and which Irigaray calls 
difference, is intimately connected with the Buddhist notion of emptiness.  In both Yoga 
and in Buddhist practice this fundamental realization of void, of sûnyatâ (emptiness), is 
cultivated experientially through the practice of meditation. The practice of meditation 
and the consequent experience of emptiness, of sûnyatâ, is characteristic of the 
Bodhisattva (one who has differed their entry into Nirvana for the benefit of all sentient 
beings) and is the product of his or her own meditative insight. To be in a state of 
universal and continuous communication in relation with the cosmos is imaged in 
Buddhist thought in the figure of the Bodhisattva, “one who is on the path to perfect 
Buddhahood, whose task is to compassionately help beings while maturing his or her 
own wisdom” (Harvey 121).  The Bodhisattva’s level of awareness entails a realized 
understanding (intellectual as well as emotional) that his or her own self is empty, and 

that the self of others is equally empty.  However, and importantly, this is not to say that 
others do not experience themselves as suffering beings.  The realization of an 
understanding of the nature of emptiness results in a qualitative change; a shift of 
orientation that Irigaray appears to have intuited when she grapples with such phrases as 
“accomplished interiority” (37) and with her assertion that “we must become gods as men 
and women” [her italics] (43).  In Buddhism this imperative is developed and refined in 
the Six Perfections, as a path or the six stages (pâramitâ) toward becoming a Bodhisattva 
– one who embodies a series of intellectual (as well as emotional) realizations that 
culminate not only in a figure for one of the ‘gods’ that Irigaray feels we must become, 
but also a figure for the redemption of human consciousness. 
The Feminist Intellect and Buddhist Thought
           How is one to account for this nexus between feminist theory, (Chinese) Taoism, 
(Indian) Yoga and (Japanese) Buddhism?  Irigaray, consciously or unconsciously, is 
reiterating Buddhist thought in secular terms, and doing so in such a way that is 
exceedingly appropriate for a feminist thinker.   In making the claim that “it is not true 
that knowledge is indifferent to sex or gender,” (59) Irigaray feels that the subject of 
Western culture is gendered male, and that, in the West, “the most spiritual becoming 
proposed then to a woman is that she can also be a man” (54).  Eastern meditation, on the 
other hand, has presented Irigaray with “an awakening to transcendence,” a 
transcendence which has given her an experience of nothingness (sûnyatâ) that she then 
incorporates into her own feminist agenda, wherein the singularity of accomplished 
interiority (Irigaray’s ‘the being I of a double subjectivity’) can be set in relation to 
community (the being we) to form a culture of “being(s)-in-relation” (104).   
          From the point of view of one who is acquainted with Buddhist thought, I think 
there is perhaps something more going on here than two female scholars engaging in 
quixotic encounters with the East.  Kristeva, and Irigaray in particular, are (consciously 
or unconsciously) appropriating tenets of Buddhist thought that have been articulated for 
over two thousand years. As a feminist thinker, it seems to me that there is something 
congenial about Buddhist thought to feminist thinkers.  Western culture has been 

concerned with the bodies of men and women in relation to the spiritual in so far as these 
bodies are constructed as brides of (a male) Christ, as feminized docile bodies ready to 
receive the active, masculinized ‘word’ which is uttered by a male subject who begot his 
only ‘son.’ What Irigaray is responding to with her involvement in Yoga practice is an 
encounter with the feminization of the divine, a feminization that is clearly evident in 
Buddhist doctrine, most particularly in one of the most revered Buddhist texts, the 
Prajnaparamita Sutra.   
The Redemptive Powers of a Feminine Intellect  
          The Prajnaparamita Sutra (prajna=wisdom) is considered to be the originating text 
for Mahayana Buddhism and to express the “transverbal enlightened reality accessible to 
the verbally cultivated mind” (Hixon xv).  Prajnaparamita, as the penultimate sixth stage 
of the path of the Bodhisattva is gendered feminine. When reading this sutra:  
passages suggest that the feminine nature of Prajnaparamita is taken seriously 
by the Sutra.  “But this mother, matrix, guide, power, and bliss of all Buddhas 
and their embrionic forms, the bodhisattvas is not simply tender and nurturing in 
some stereotypical sense of the feminine.  Mother Prajnaparamita expresses her 
mystic motherhood equally and perhaps more centrally as the uncompromising 
discipline of transcendent insight.  A union of inexhaustible tenderness and 
diamond clarity that is like open space radiates from this sutra as the strong
feminine voice of Prajnaparamita, heard directly by all the fully awakened Ones, 
the humble Lords of Enlightenment” [his italics] (17). 
        This feminization of the supreme realization of Buddhist thought conveys a sense of 
agency to women, no less to Irigaray’s intuition than to my own intellectual endeavors.  
For those of us in the West who have led a beleaguered life in the realm of theory, 
attempting to accommodate our hearts and minds to a universalized masculine body of 
knowledge, the philosophy of the East, and in particular, Buddhist thought, offers us a 
paradigm for a feminized body of knowledge.  Irigaray seems to understand the potential 
for this feminization of a (divine) spirit when she calls for “the institution of a symbolic 
world that does not perpetuate an ethical offense toward the feminine ‘I’ and ‘we’” (102). 

Conclusion
          If Kristeva’s intuition and Irigaray’s articulation of the fruits of her practice are any 
indication, Buddhism, and the secular accommodation of Buddhist thought amidst 
philosophers, activists and thinkers, may provide a qualitatively new horizon with which 
to envision the evolution of human consciousness.  Irigaray feels that the stakes are high, 
for if there is not a qualitative (and I would say gendered) shift in the spirit of our age 
then “this fin de siecle, if it does not mark the entry into another era, risks being nothing 
but a pitiful decline of the human species…” (Irigaray 145).   To realize ourselves (men 
and women) in relation to one another and to encounter oneself through ones own 
interiority amidst that relation in this very body is a suitable aspiration not only for 
Shingon Buddhists, but for any sentient being who seeks the redemption of human 
consciousness in the pursuit of knowledge. 
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